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MARRIAGE AND THE ELEPHANT: 
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE’S 
REGULATION OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN ADULTS 
Maxine Eichner* 
Since [all six men were] blind, none had ever seen [an ele-
phant]. . . . [T]he men took turns to investigate the elephant’s shape 
and form. 
 
The ªrst blind man to approach the elephant . . . cried out, “it is 
as sure as I am wise that this elephant is like a great mud wall 
baked hard in the sun. . . .” 
 
 “Now, my brothers,” the [second] man exclaimed with a cry of 
dawning recognition, “I can tell you what shape this elephant is—
he is exactly like a spear . . . .” 
 
Now it was the turn of the third blind man. . . . “Why dear broth-
ers, do you not see—this elephant is very much like a rope,” he 
shouted . . . . 
 
“Ha, I thought as much,” [the fourth man] declared excitedly. “This 
elephant much resembles a serpent . . . .” 
 
 “Good gracious, brothers,” [the ªfth man] called out, “even a 
blind man can see what shape the elephant resembles most. Why, 
he’s mighty like a fan . . . .” 
 
At last, it was the turn of the sixth old fellow . . . . Feeling it won-
deringly with both hands, he called to the others. “This sturdy pil-
lar, brothers mine, feels exactly like the trunk of the great areca 
palm tree.”1 
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College, 1984. I owe my thanks to a number of people who have given me insightful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article, including Kathryn Abrams, Jennifer Collins, John 
Conley, Marion Crain, Adrienne Davis, Clare Huntington, Michael Lienesch, William Mar-
shall, Linda McClain, Hiroshi Motomura, Elizabeth Scott, Mary Shanley, Thomas 
Spragens, Eric Stein, Mark Weisburd, and Deborah Weissman. Special thanks are due to 
my research assistants, Carolyn Pratt and Cameron Contizano, as well as to Julianne 
Johnston and the other editors at the Harvard Journal of Law & Gender for their very 
thoughtful editing. 
1
 James Riordan, Six Blind Men and an Elephant, in An Illustrated Treasury of 
26 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30 
For much of the twentieth century, the state’s position with respect 
to marriage and other intimate relationships between adults sparked little 
conversation in legal and political theory. Instead, the state’s role in put-
ting its seal of approval on marital relationships and discouraging other 
intimate relationships was generally treated as an unquestioned fact. To 
the extent that the state’s position on intimate relationships was raised at 
all, commentary centered on the relative ease with which persons gener-
ally, or particular classes of persons speciªcally, could be married2 or di-
vorced,3 and on the consequences of divorce.4 The legitimacy of the state’s 
 
                                                                                                                             
Fairy and Folk Tales 30, 30–33 (1986). 
2
 For example, a considerable amount of the literature on marriage during the 1980s and 
early 1990s focused on the right of members of particular groups to marry. Prison inmates 
were one of the groups that received the most attention. See, e.g., Bradford L. Thomas, 
Restricting State Prisoners’ Due Process Rights: The Supreme Court Demonstrates Its 
Loyalty to Judicial Restraint, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 215 (1992) (highlighting the Court’s def-
erence to state decisions when reviewing challenged prison regulations, including restric-
tions on marriage); Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional 
Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 275 (1985) (arguing 
against marital restrictions on prisoners). The rights of those with HIV and AIDS to marry 
also provoked conversation. See, e.g., Robert D. Goodman, In Sickness or in Health: The 
Right to Marry and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DePaul L. Rev. 87 (1988) (dis-
cussing the implications of HIV testing on the rights of those with AIDS to marry); Law-
rence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 Am. J.L. & Med. 461, 469 (1986) 
(arguing that a Utah statute prohibiting any person with AIDS from marrying would likely 
be found unconstitutional). The issue of immigrants’ rights to marry was also explored. 
See, e.g., Jesse I. Santana, The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section 
Five of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 25 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1 (1988) 
(arguing that the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments violate the Procedural Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Eileen P. Lynskey, 
Comment, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do Us Part, 
41 U. Miami L. Rev. 1087 (1987) (arguing that the restrictions Congress placed on the 
distribution of marriage beneªts to aliens in the Marriage Fraud Amendments violate im-
migrants’ constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of law as well as the 
constitutional rights of Americans who wish to marry aliens); Vonnell C. Tingle, Note, 
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: Locking In By Locking Out?, 27 J. 
Fam. L. 733 (1989) (assessing the effectiveness of the 1986 Marriage Fraud Amendments 
in appropriately deterring fraudulent marriages). 
3
 For example, in the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, a great number of 
law review articles focused on the then-occurring no-fault divorce revolution sweeping the 
states. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 
Cal. L. Rev. 291 (1987) (describing policy issues driving the no-fault divorce movement 
and evaluating the social effects of no-fault divorce laws on women and children); Herma 
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 
56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1987) (arguing that no-fault divorce laws can help women achieve 
greater equality in their divorces); Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, 
Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 493 
(1987) (describing potential beneªts of no-fault divorce laws for women); Thomas B. Mar-
vell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 Law & Soc’y Rev. 543 (1989) (present-
ing evidence that no-fault divorce laws signiªcantly increased divorces in only a minority 
of states); Doris Sybella Vivaz, Note, Balancing Children’s Rights into the Divorce Deci-
sion, 13 Vt. L. Rev. 531 (1989) (arguing that the no-fault divorce laws ignore the best inter-
ests of children). 
4
 See, e.g., Charles F. Basil, The Divisibility of Pension Interests on Divorce: The Dis-
trict of Columbia Ups the Ante, 33 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1087 (1984) (evaluating the practice of 
treating pension interests as marital property); Helen A. Boyer, Recent Development, Equi-
2007] Regulation of Intimate Relationships Among Adults 27 
involvement in and support for marriage itself, however, went largely undis-
puted. 
Recent legal, political, and social events, however, have turned this state 
of affairs on its head. The string of legal cases involving same-sex mar-
riage challenges, beginning with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in 
Baehr v. Lewin in 1993,5 and extending through the recent decision of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Lewis v. Harris,6 in combination with the con-
tinuing political reaction to these decisions,7 has fomented a vigorous debate 
 
                                                                                                                             
table Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a Professional Degree at 
Dissolution—In Re Marriage of Washburn, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 431 (1985) (arguing that the 
supporting spouse of a partner who earned a graduate degree should be deemed to have a 
property interest in his or her spouse’s increased earning capacity); Michelle Dorsey Deis, 
Case Comment, Gross v. Gross: Ohio’s First Step Toward Allowing Private Ordering of the 
Marital Relationship, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 235 (1986) (discussing the difªculty of applying 
family law and contract law principles to validate antenuptial agreements with divorce 
provisions); Michael Diehl, Note, The Trust in Marital Law: Divisibility of a Beneªciary 
Spouse’s Interests on Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1986) (discussing the ways in which 
divorce courts in different jurisdictions apply and interpret marital property laws involving 
trusts); Barb Mattei, Comment, 1984 Deªcit Reduction Act: Divorce Taxation, 1986 Wis. 
L. Rev. 177 (1986) (evaluating results of the Deªcit Reduction Act on marriage and di-
vorce law). 
5
 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
6
 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). Thus far, however, only one state’s supreme court, Massa-
chusetts, has declared that its state constitution requires that the state allow same-sex mar-
riage. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), related pro-
ceeding at 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). Massachusetts, which began issuing licenses to 
same-sex couples on May 17, 2004, is the only state that currently permits same-sex mar-
riage. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 
Times, May 17, 2004, at A16; see also David W. Chen, Trenton Court Considers Gay Mar-
riage Issue, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2006, at B8. 
Two other states’ supreme courts, New Jersey and Vermont, have declared that their 
state constitutions require that the state afford same-sex couples the same rights and beneªts 
as married couples, but that the state need not formally admit such couples into the institu-
tion of marriage. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224; Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 
1999). In the mid-1990s, Hawaii courts seemed poised to strike down the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage, see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44; Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 
694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), but before courts ruled on the issue, the state’s citi-
zens amended the Hawaii Constitution to allow the legislature to prohibit same-sex mar-
riage. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23; see also Editorial, Hawaii’s Ban on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1999, at A36. 
Recently, same-sex marriage challenges have failed in other state courts. On July 6, 
2006, in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), New York’s highest court ruled 
against extending marriage to same-sex couples. Twenty days later, in Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc), the Washington Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s same-sex marriage ban in a 5-4 vote. On October 5, 2006, the California Court of 
Appeals for the First District, an intermediate level court, held that the state’s ban on same-
sex marriage did not violate the California Constitution. See In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). That case is expected to be appealed to the California 
Supreme Court. See Gay Marriage Ban Upheld by Calif. Court, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 2006, 
at A11.  
7
 See supra note 6 (discussing the political reaction to Hawaii courts’ likely striking 
down the state’s ban on same-sex marriage). On the national level, reaction to Baehr led to 
the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (“DOMA”), 
which declares that no state must give effect to a same-sex marriage celebrated in another 
state, and that the term “marriage” for purposes of federal law is conªned to the union of a 
28 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30 
in legal and political theory regarding the state’s appropriate role in rela-
tionships between adults. This debate has been spurred on, as well, by social 
developments, including the increasing visibility of same-sex relationships,8 
the mushrooming rates of single-parent families,9 and the increasing num-
bers of couples who cohabit without marriage.10 
The resulting conversation among political and legal theorists has 
been complex. Many in the conversation have argued that marriage rights 
should be extended to same-sex couples.11 Others have argued that states 
 
                                                                                                                             
man and woman. Id. As of 2006, thirty-nine states had adopted legislation similar to the 
federal DOMA, often called “mini-DOMAs,” which bar the state from recognizing a same-
sex marriage celebrated in another state. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide 
Marriage Laws, http://hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=28225& 
TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). 
Twenty-seven states have also adopted state constitutional amendments that bar same-sex 
marriage. See Monica Davey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot Measures, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 9, 2006, at P16. This includes Hawaii, whose state constitution does not ban same-sex 
marriage, but authorizes the state legislature to do so. See Human Rights Campaign, State 
Prohibitions on Marriage for Same-Sex Couple [sic], http://hrc.org/Template.cfm? 
Section=Center&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDis
play.cfm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006). As of the end of 2006, only in one state, Arizona, 
have voters rejected a proposed constitutional measure to ban same-sex marriage. See Davey, 
supra. 
8
 The 2000 U.S. Census counted 601,209 same-sex unmarried partner households. See 
David M. Smith & Gary J. Gates, Gay and Lesbian Families in the United States: 
Same-Sex Unmarried Partner Households 1 (2001), http:/www.urban.org/Uploaded 
PDF/1000491_gl_partner_households.pdf. That is a 314% increase from the 1990 Census, 
although the manner of coding these responses probably caused signiªcant undercounting 
in the earlier census. Id. at 1, 3. It is likely that actual numbers are higher than even the 
2000 Census reveals due to underreporting of these relationships. Id. at 2–3.  
9
 In 1960, 9% of children lived in single-parent homes; by 1999, that ªgure had risen 
to 27%. Stephanie Sado & Angela Bayer, Population Resource Center, Executive 
Summary: The Changing American Family (2001), http://www.prcdc.org/summaries/ 
family/family.html. The rise in single-parent families is attributable not only to increased 
divorce rates, but to an increase in the number of families in which the parents were never 
married. Id. The percentage of children born out of wedlock increased at an accelerated 
pace beginning in the 1960s. Id. It has recently climbed to a record high, accounting for 
almost four in ten children born in 2005. See Babies Born to Singles Are at Record: Nearly 
4 in 10, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2006, at A22. During the same period, fertility rates of mar-
ried women declined. Id. Overall, almost one in every three families with children is 
headed by a woman who has never been married. Kristen Luker, Dubious Concep-
tions: The Politics of Teenage Pregnancy 103 (1996). 
10
 “Census estimates indicate that in 1977 there were 1.1 million cohabiting couples, 
about 1.5% of all households . . . .” Renata Forste, Prelude to Marriage or Alternative to 
Marriage?, 4 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 91, 91 (2002). By 1997, that number had risen to 4.9 
million couples, or 4.8% of all households. Id.  
11
 See, e.g, William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage (1996) (con-
tending that same-sex marriage would be good both for the United States and for homo-
sexuals); William N. Eskridge, Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A 
Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 641 (2000) (ar-
guing that commitment to equality dictates recognition of same-sex marriage); Andrew 
Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case against Same-Sex Marriage, 76 St. Thomas 
L.J. 5 (2004) (arguing that the arguments against same-sex marriage fail); Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. Chi. Le-
gal F. 225 (2004) (defending marriage’s privileged status but arguing that beneªts should 
be extended to same-sex couples); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Auton-
2007] Regulation of Intimate Relationships Among Adults 29 
should retain the institution of marriage, but continue to restrict it to het-
erosexual couples.12 Some have contended that particular rights and privi-
leges presently conªned to married couples should be extended to cohab-
iting couples,13 as well as to a variety of other relationships.14 Still others, 
including some gay rights advocates, believe that the state has no legiti-
mate business regulating adult relationships, and assert that the state should 
remove itself completely from sanctioning marriage and other intimate 
relationships.15 Finally, even those who agree that the state should support 
marriage disagree about the amount of ªnancial, legal, or social support 
that it should extend.16 
 
                                                                                                                             
omy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 265 (2000) (con-
tending that states’ failure to recognize same-sex marriage is incoherent and bad policy). 
12
 See, e.g., Council on Family Law, The Future of Family Law: Law and the 
Marriage Crisis In North America (2005) (arguing that the institution of marriage 
properly links bonding sexual difference and caring for children); George W. Dent, Jr., The 
Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & Pol. 581 (1999) (arguing that states have 
strong reasons to favor traditional marriage, and to exclude same-sex marriage from legal 
protection); Lynn D. Wardle, Is Marriage Obsolete?, 10 Mich. J. Gender & L. 189, 223–
24 (2003) (arguing that same-sex relationships do not provide the social beneªts that mar-
riage, as the “building block of society,” provides); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-
Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redeªning Marriage, 39 
S. Tex. L. Rev. 735 (1998) (challenging justiªcations for state recognition of homosexual 
relationships). 
13
 See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis 
and Recommendations, §§ 6.01–6.06 (2002) (providing that support provisions and 
property distribution rights should apply at the end of certain nonmarital relationships); 
Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Re-
sponsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265 (2001) (pro-
posing periodic support payments and property division to members of cohabiting couples 
who separate); Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute 
Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 87 (2001) (sup-
porting American Law Institute proposals); Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was 
Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365 (2001) (arguing for a greater recogni-
tion of same-sex couples through the application of status-based rules and the granting of 
beneªts to such couples); Martha Ertman, The ALI Principles’ Approach to Domestic Part-
nership, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 107, 114 (2001) (proposing that members of inti-
mate relationships select from a range of legal regulations, without bias for any particular 
afªliation). 
14
 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 
201 (2003) (advocating equal state support for equally valuable intimate relationships, 
rather than state support solely for marriage); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter 
Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 353 (2004) (praising the ALI Principles’ support for property rights for unmar-
ried cohabitants as a positive step toward equal recognition for all committed relation-
ships); Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard For Marriage and Other Imperfect Intimate 
Afªliations, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 331, 340 (2003) (arguing for “the need to give legal rec-
ognition and form to the rich diversity of intimate bonds that have emerged beyond mar-
riage”). 
15
 See, e.g., Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (2004) (asserting that the state 
should abolish civil marriage as an institution); Michael Warner, The Trouble With 
Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (1999) (arguing that queer eth-
ics favor the abolition of marriage); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should 
Read Martha Fineman, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 167 (2000) (arguing that the 
state should stop privileging marriage altogether). 
16
 Compare Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the 
30 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30 
What explains these vastly disparate claims regarding the state’s po-
sition concerning intimate relationships? And how should these very dif-
ferent views be resolved? I argue here that commentators reach such widely 
divergent results because they tend to focus on only a part of the range of 
important goods and principles at stake in these relationships. For exam-
ple, many advocates of eliminating marriage argue that the state’s sup-
port of the institution violates important principles of individual freedom 
and equal regard for all persons.17 Advocates in favor of marriage, by con-
trast, often point to the association between that institution and children’s 
well-being.18 Intimate adult relationships, however, implicate not just one 
or two goods and principles, but a number of important goods and prin-
ciples that the state should take into account in crafting its family policy. 
To complicate matters further, the pursuit of some of these goods and prin-
ciples may conºict with other goods and principles. To derive the state’s 
policy on intimate relationships from consideration of just one or two of 
 
                                                                                                                             
Nurturing of Children?, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 847, 876–79 (2005) (contending that the 
state should encourage marriage, but cautioning that providing too many incentives for 
marriage could induce couples to obtain the marriage certiªcate without a serious commit-
ment), and Scott, supra note 11 (arguing for a limited range of incentives to support mar-
riage), with Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 Cal. W. 
Int’l L.J. 1 (2000) (broadly arguing that the state should foster marriage as against all other 
relationships among adults), and Patrick F. Fagan, Robert E. Rector & Lauren R. Noyes, 
The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1662, Why Congress Should Ignore 
Radical Feminist Opposition to Marriage 1 (2003), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ 
Features/Marriage/upload/44139_1.pdf (arguing that marriage is good for men, women, chil-
dren, and society, and supporting initiatives such as President George W. Bush’s pilot program 
to promote healthy marriage), Patrick F. Fagan, Marriage and the Family, in The Heri-
tage Foundation, Issues 2006: The Candidate’s Brieªng Book 7, 7–8 (2006), http:// 
www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/pdfs/Family.pdf (advocating strengthening mar-
riage and the family through federal and state law, through easing economic and other burdens 
on marital families, and through encouraging healthy marriages through welfare reform), 
and National Fatherhood Initiative et al., Can Government Strengthen Marriage? 
Evidence from the Social Sciences (2004), http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/Can%20 
Government%20Strengthen%20Marriage.pdf (proposing government funding of marriage 
programming, such as marriage preparation and education services, vouchers for low-income 
marriage education, tax policies, Medicaid marriage penalties, and job training for low-income 
fathers, in order to strengthen marriage).  
17
 See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 15; Warner, supra note 15. I am borrowing Judith 
Stacey’s term “equal regard.” See Stacey, supra note 14, at 331. Stacey, in turn, borrows 
the term from Don Browning, Critical Familism, Civil Society, and the Law, 32 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 313, 317 (2003), although she changes his intended meaning in borrowing it. I use 
the term in much the way that Stacey uses it, to refer to the principle—which is bedrock in 
liberalism—that all humans are entitled to an equal level of respect simply by virtue of 
their humanity. It is this principle that Michael Warner calls to mind when he distinguishes 
the conception of dignity that is “modern and democratic” from the older meaning of the 
term. Warner, supra note 15, at 36. Dignity in this modern sense “is not pomp and dis-
tinction; it is inherent in the human.” Id.  
18
 See, e.g., William A. Galston, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Fam-
ily, The Responsive Community, Winter 1990–1991 14, 14–17 (highlighting association 
between marriage and children’s well-being); Council on Family Law, supra note 12; 
see also William C. Duncan, Law and Culture: The State Interests in Marriage, 2 Ave Maria 
L. Rev. 153, 165–68 (2004) (arguing that traditional two-parent families provide the com-
plete nurturing that children need to develop into responsible, committed citizens). 
2007] Regulation of Intimate Relationships Among Adults 31 
the goods and principles at stake in relationships among adults—freedom, 
or equal regard, or ensuring that children develop into good citizens, to 
give only a partial list—recalls the Indian story of the blind men who, on 
encountering an elephant, all felt different parts of the animal and emerged 
with radically different descriptions of the nature of the beast. It is only 
through an approach that recognizes the multiplicity of important goods 
and principles implicated in the state’s approach to relationships between 
adults, and that seeks to give each its due, that a workable approach ap-
propriate to intimate relationships can be fashioned. 
My argument in this Article is grounded in a particular conception of 
the role of the state in a liberal democracy.19 Proponents of this form of 
government generally acknowledge its commitment to the equal worth of all 
human beings, the importance of limits on government, respect for individ-
ual rights, and the view that legitimate government rests on the consent 
of its citizens. More controversially, this form of government has become 
associated with the view that these commitments limit the state to fur-
thering only individualistic versions of the goods of liberty and equal-
ity.20 The account that I develop in this Article rejects this narrower vi-
sion of liberalism.21 It is grounded in the belief that the goods and norma-
tive principles that should animate a liberal democracy, and that the liberal 
democratic state should pursue, are both broader and more complex than 
the admittedly important goods of liberty and equality.22 Among them, given 
 
                                                                                                                             
19
 I use the term “liberal” throughout this Article to refer to the Anglo-American line 
of political thought stretching from John Locke through John Stuart Mill and on to such 
contemporary thinkers as John Rawls, whose work focuses on the importance of liberty, 
self-government, and equal rights for citizens. This use of the term is therefore broader 
than the use of the term “liberal” in common parlance to refer to those who hold political 
beliefs at the opposite end of the political spectrum from conservatives. Under my use of 
the term, both thinkers such as John Rawls, who might qualify as a liberal under common 
usage, and Robert Nozick, who might be considered a political conservative, are “liberals.” 
20
 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 113 (Stu-
art Hampshire ed., 1978) (arguing that a liberal society is one that embodies no particular 
views regarding the ends of life; society, instead, is united around a procedural commit-
ment to treat people with equal respect); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 4, 7, 302–03 
(1971) (conceiving justice in terms of the good of autonomy through Rawls’s ªrst princi-
ple, which guarantees to all persons such liberty as is consistent with the same liberty to 
others, and equality through Rawls’s second “maximin” principle, which would distribute 
social and economic resources to beneªt the least advantaged in society). 
21
 This Article is one part of a larger project in which I consider the role of the liberal 
democratic state in dealing with issues of dependency and family ties. For other parts of 
this project, see Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fine-
man’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1285 (2005); Maxine Eichner, Civic Educa-
tion and the Liberal Democratic Polity, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007); Maxine 
Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Rethinking Relationships in the Child Welfare 
System, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 448 (2005); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round 
Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 133 (1998). 
22
 In the last few years, several liberal theorists have argued that the ideals underlying 
the liberal project are more ambitious and broader than versions often associated with it. 
See, e.g., William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the 
Liberal State 7–15 (1991) (contending that a liberal state cannot and should not be neu-
tral with respect to all versions of the good); Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Dis-
32 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 30 
the signiªcant role that dependency plays in the human condition, are 
furthering caretaking and human development.23 Put another way, although a 
liberal democracy should give signiªcant pride of place to the goods of 
individual liberty and equality, it must also pay attention to an array of other 
goods and principles relating to human dependency and human develop-
ment that are necessary to a robust democracy and that too often have 
been excluded from standard liberal accounts.24 In my view, it is only by 
considering this richer range of goods and principles, and by seeking 
more nuanced approaches that ameliorate the tension among them, that the 
appropriate relationship between families and the state can be brought into 
focus. 
My hope in this Article is to offer such a workable approach. In Part 
I, I consider four prominent entries in the debate over the state’s treatment of 
relationships between adults. The ªrst two of these views—Martha 
Fineman’s and Michael Warner’s—argue that the state should eliminate 
civil marriage. The other pair of entries—William Galston’s and the Council 
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on Family Law’s25—asserts that the state should continue to privilege mar-
riage as an institution. I demonstrate that the arguments opposing mar-
riage reach different conclusions from those supporting it because they 
focus on different goods and principles important to a liberal democracy. 
In Part II, I develop an approach, which I call the “supportive state,”26 
that takes into account the range of goods and principles implicated in 
intimate relationships among adults. These include not only principles of 
freedom and equal regard, but also ensuring caretaking for adults and 
children, sex equality, equality of opportunity, and civic fellowship. The 
supportive state seeks to reconcile this diverse range of goods by ensur-
ing a threshold level of liberty and equal regard for all adults, whether or 
not they are involved in intimate relationships, while at the same time ac-
cording limited privileges to a range of intimate relationships because of 
the important goods they produce. In doing so, however, the supportive state 
also actively seeks to remedy the negative consequences associated with 
such relationships—particularly increased gender inequality, increased ine-
quality of opportunity, and the possibility that these relationships will cause 
their participants to turn away from civic life. 
In Part III, I consider two difªcult issues that the state must confront 
with respect to regulating intimate relationships. The ªrst of these is the 
form that state recognition of such relationships should take. Speciªcally, 
I pose the question of whether the state should eliminate marriage as a dis-
tinct category and instead recognize all adult intimate relationships under 
a single civil status such as “domestic partnership.” Or should the state 
make available a number of different types of formal relationships that 
citizens can enter? In the latter case, the state would presumably retain a 
civil status for conjugal relationships such as marriage, but also recog-
nize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic partner-
ships among siblings or friends who are committed to caretaking. I then 
turn to consider the complicated issue of the manner in which the state may 
legitimately seek to encourage two-parent families over single-parent fami-
lies, and marital relationships over other relationships between adults. 
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I. Theoretical Positions in the Existing Conversation 
In the discussion about the state’s treatment of relationships between 
adults, a signiªcant portion of the recent debate has focused on the contro-
versy between those who believe that the state has no business interfering 
in relationships between adults and those who argue precisely the oppo-
site. In this section, I consider the arguments of theorists on both sides of 
this issue: Martha Fineman and Michael Warner, who both argue for elimi-
nating the state’s involvement in marriage; and William Galston and the 
Council on Family Law, who both argue that the state should promote the 
institution. I contend that both sides point to important goods at stake in 
the state’s treatment of such relationships, but that these goods cannot be 
considered independently. Instead, they must be weighed against the other 
important goods and principles at stake in these relationships. 
A. Martha Fineman—Marriage as a Misguided Quest for Autonomy 
Martha Fineman, one of the country’s foremost feminist legal theo-
rists, takes a strong stand against state support for marriage.27 Current public 
policy, she argues, is based on the myth that families should be autono-
mous.28 Because the marital family is seen as a strong and independent unit, 
it is viewed as representing the ideal that the state should be promoting.29 
As a result, Fineman points out with irony, married couples receive hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of subsidies and privileges from the state that are 
unavailable to other, supposedly less autonomous, family forms.30 
Fineman objects to state support for the marital family on several 
grounds. Most importantly, she contends that the state’s pursuit of the 
good of autonomy for its citizens is misguided.31 Complete autonomy, she 
asserts, is possible for no one, including married couples: in contemporary 
society, everyone exists within a web of institutions that provide for at least 
some of everyone’s needs.32 Because of this, Fineman argues, the state’s 
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pursuit of autonomy should be abandoned in favor of ensuring that hu-
man needs are humanely and justly met for all citizens, not just those who 
live in families.33 Insofar as the state uses the rationale of children’s wel-
fare to justify its support of the marital family, she contends, it wrongly 
ignores the large numbers of children raised out of wedlock.34 A state that 
truly seeks to support the welfare of children should therefore support child-
rearing in all the contexts in which it occurs, not just for children whose 
parents are married.35 
Fineman argues that instead of subsidizing a particular type of family, 
i.e., the marital family, the liberal state should subsidize the particular 
functions that it has a legitimate interest in supporting, in whatever rela-
tionships these functions take place.36 She contends that the inevitability 
of dependency in children and in others creates a need for caretaking that 
gives the state a legitimate interest in subsidizing caretaker-dependent rela-
tionships.37 By contrast, Fineman argues that the state has no legitimate 
stake in furthering relationships between capable adults, and therefore 
should abandon civil marriage as an institution.38 In the new regime she 
proposes, legal relationships between adults would be governed by private 
contracts negotiated between them. This would leave marriage as a purely 
religious institution for those couples who choose to enter it, with no civil 
consequences. 
Assessing Fineman’s argument produces mixed results. Fineman is cer-
tainly right that complete autonomy is possible for no one, and that the 
state should therefore give up its quest for totally autonomous families. 
However, Fineman reaches the conclusion that the state should withdraw 
from supporting relationships among adults by ignoring important goods. 
As care theorists have made abundantly clear,39 and as Fineman herself ar-
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gues,40 it is not just children and those with disabilities who need care: all 
humans need care, even generally healthy adults. Recognition of the fact of 
dependency therefore gives the state an interest in furthering the good of 
caretaking among adults.41 And as our society is organized, some large por-
tion of the care that adults need will come, if it comes at all, from other 
adults with whom we share close relationships. In such relationships, al-
though neither person is always the caretaker or the dependent (as they are, 
for example, in relationships between adults and young children) caretaking 
still occurs. 
Adult-adult relationships are, at their best, marked by what might be 
called “reciprocal dependency,”42 in which each person sometimes per-
forms caretaking activities for the other and meets the other’s dependency 
needs; in turn, the other partner does the same for that person at other times. 
These relationships, when they function well, involve countless small acts in 
which each adult takes care of the other: one partner makes the other a cup 
of coffee when the other gets up; the other picks up groceries on the way 
home from work; one runs to the store for cold medicine when the other 
is sick; and so on. This sort of caretaking, at its best, produces a society 
in which adults are knit into webs of care that help them to support one an-
other. In these webs, one partner’s cold does not develop into something 
worse because the other partner insists on taking him or her to a doctor. 
Moreover, this caretaking helps keep families stable so that partners are 
there for one another at times when one of them has greater needs, such 
as during periods of disability. The state has an important interest in these 
relationships because of its interest in the dignity of its citizens, not to men-
tion their health and well-being. 
As my description suggests, moreover, recognition of the fact of de-
pendency need not and should not lead to rejecting family autonomy com-
pletely as a good. Instead, it should lead to recognition of the value of a 
more limited and transformed version of family autonomy, and the role 
that the state can play in supporting it. This revised version of autonomy 
would recognize the fact of dependency and the consequent need for care-
taking, as well as understand that in contemporary society no individual 
or family stands completely apart from the state. Yet it would also recog-
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nize the important beneªts that come from families having the capacity to 
meet their family’s basic dependency needs. This level of capability and 
self-sufªciency helps ensure that human dependency needs are not only met, 
but met in a manner superior to that which the state could provide, in the 
sense that caretaking is delivered by family members who know and re-
spond to the needs of the dependent. Achieving this level of familial ca-
pability, though, requires not state engagement, but state support. 
This does not mean that Fineman is wrong when she argues that the 
state’s obligation to children and other dependents should lead it to sup-
port caretaking in whatever family forms caretaker-dependent relationships 
occur. The state has an obligation to support the well-being of societal de-
pendents that stems directly from the liberal democratic state’s respect for 
human dignity. This obligation undoubtedly requires the state to support 
children, no matter into which family forms they are born. Yet this duty 
to support the well-being of all children does not necessarily require that 
the state treat all caretaker-dependent relationships the same in all respects, 
as Fineman seems to suggest. Instead, a liberal democracy may legitimately 
decide that its interest in the well-being of its young citizens makes some 
family forms better for children than others because these forms gener-
ally promote the capacity to meet family members’ dependency needs. The 
state may, in such a case, legitimately take some measures to encourage 
the rearing of children in these family forms, so long as it does not jeop-
ardize the well-being of children not raised in these families. 
B. Michael Warner—Marriage as the Misguided Search 
for Respectability 
While Fineman argues against marriage on the ground that we should 
eliminate autonomy as a goal and instead focus on children’s well-being, 
queer theorists have argued for the same result by focusing on the liberal 
democratic commitment to liberty and equal regard of all citizens. Among 
these theorists, Michael Warner’s arguments stand out for their eloquence 
and theoretical acuity. Warner contends that the gay community’s current 
push for same-sex marriage runs the risk of requiring the wholesale “repu-
diation of queer culture’s best insights on intimate relations, sex, and the 
politics of stigma.”43 He argues that the early years of the gay rights move-
ment in the United States developed a vision of queer politics centered on 
the recognition that all humans, and all human relationships, are worthy of 
equal respect. The ethical heart of this lesson of equal respect comes, para-
doxically, from queer culture’s experience with the shamefulness of sex: 
[T]he ground rule is that one doesn’t pretend to be above the in-
dignity of sex . . . . Sex is understood to be as various as the people 
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who have it. It is not required to be tidy, normal, uniform, or au-
thorized by the government. This kind of culture is often de-
nounced as relativist, self-indulgent, or merely libertine. In fact, 
it has its own norms, its own way of keeping people in line . . . . 
A relation to others, in these contexts, begins in an acknowledge-
ment of all that is most abject and least reputable in oneself. 
Shame is bedrock. Queers can be abusive, insulting, and vile to-
ward one another, but because abjection is understood to be the 
shared condition, they also know how to communicate through 
such camaraderie a moving and unexpected form of generosity 
. . . . The rule is: Get over yourself. Put a wig on before you judge. 
And the corollary is that you stand to learn most from the peo-
ple you think are beneath you. At its best, this ethic cuts against 
every form of hierarchy you could bring into the room . . . . 
 
For this reason, paradoxically, the ethic of queer life is actually 
truer to the core of the modern notion of dignity than the usual use 
of the word is . . . . Dignity in [this] sense is not pomp and distinc-
tion; it is inherent in the human . . . . And the paradoxical result 
is that only when this indignity of sex is spread around the room, 
leaving no one out, and in fact binding people together, that it 
begins to resemble the dignity of the human. In order to be consis-
tent, we would have to talk about dignity in shame . . . .44 
This ethic of queer politics, Warner contends, is undercut by the cur-
rent advocacy in the gay community for same-sex marriage. Warner argues 
that marriage is the means through which the state has historically sought 
to privilege and promote a particular, monogamous model of heterosexual 
sexuality, and to stigmatize all other models as morally tainted.45 Accord-
ing to Warner, this represents the blatant imposition of the majority’s view of 
what is morally proper on the minority, and the denial of equal regard. He 
argues: 
[T]his kind of social engineering is questionable. It brings the ma-
chinery of administration to bear on the realm of pleasures and 
intimate relations, aiming to stiºe variety among ways of living. 
It authorizes the state to make one form of life—already norma-
tive—even more privileged. The state’s administrative penetra-
tion into contemporary life may have numbed us to the deep co-
erciveness in this way of thinking. We take it for granted. Yet it is 
blind majoritarianism, armed not only with an impressive battery 
of prohibitions and punishments, but with an equally impressive 
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battery of economistic incentives and disincentives, all designed 
to manipulate not just the economic choices of the populace, but 
people’s substantive and normative vision of the good life.46 
For many of us (myself included), there is much that is attractive about 
Warner’s vision. Its power comes from his mobilization of some of the 
goods that are fundamental to liberal democratic ideals. Warner’s argument 
rests on the recognition of the human dignity and essential equality of all 
persons—the very recognition that distinguished the liberal tradition from 
the feudalism that preceded it. At the same time, Warner makes a power-
ful case for the personal freedom that liberals hold dear: it is up to citi-
zens rather than the state to determine what course in life is right for them. 
Further, the state has no business in the bedrooms of its citizens. And neither 
should the state delegitimize some relationships and activities (such as sex 
outside of marriage) based on the preferences of the majority. Somewhat 
less obvious but still a clear contributor to the persuasiveness of Warner’s 
account is the good of civic fellowship: as Warner presents it, the recogni-
tion that all are partners in shame leads to camaraderie, a recognition that 
we are all in this together, a willingness to learn from one another, and gen-
erosity and a spirited sense of community. 
The importance of all these goods—the recognition of the human dig-
nity and essential equality of all persons, the importance of freedom, and 
the value of civic fellowship—to a liberal democracy cannot be understated. 
(And, indeed, the value of civic fellowship is too often left out of liberal de-
mocratic accounts.) Yet they do not occupy the entire ªeld of important 
goods. While respect for individual freedom gives a liberal democracy 
strong reason to allow its citizens to enter into consensual relationships 
of their choice, it is simply not the case that the state has an equal interest 
in the success of all consensual relationships. Neither is it the case that re-
spect for human dignity requires that all relationships be treated in an even-
handed manner. Long-term caretaking relationships contribute particular, 
important beneªts to the polity because they satisfy dependency needs in 
a way that casual sex between two (or more) persons in an apartment or a 
bathhouse—whether these people are straight, gay, bisexual, or queer—does 
not. While its deep respect for liberty should therefore mandate that the 
state permit casual sex (barring some legitimate public concern of the state), 
it should not have to treat these relationships on a par with relationships 
necessary to perpetuate the health of the polity. To do otherwise recalls 
Robert Frost’s deªnition of a liberal as someone who cannot take his own 
side in an argument.47 
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At the heart of the difªculties with Warner’s vision is the fragility of 
its ethical base, which makes it ill-equipped to accomplish the human care-
taking that must occur in any good society. The question is not whether 
Warner’s esteem for liberty, equal regard, and human dignity is normatively 
attractive—it certainly is. The question is whether this vision alone could 
reasonably be expected to support the responsibility and commitment that 
human dependency and the consequent need for caretaking entail. Warner 
dismisses the claim that his vision, as effectuated in queer culture, will lead 
to relativism, self-indulgence, or libertinism, arguing that queer culture po-
lices itself, and that the recognition of the common bond between queers 
creates a generosity and sense of ties among them that overcome these ten-
dencies.48 While this may be the case within queer subculture, that kind 
of self-policing seems far less likely to happen in the more heterogeneous 
culture outside of queer life. Warner, then, is overly optimistic that the 
state’s promotion of evenhanded respect for all forms of life will lead to 
the committed ties that human dependency requires. Given their importance, 
a liberal democracy can and should be able to encourage the norms of com-
mitment and responsibility that foster caretaking. 
C. Galston—Marriage as a Means To Support Children’s Well-being 
Fineman’s and Warner’s arguments against marriage stand in stark 
contrast to arguments from William Galston favoring marriage.49 Galston 
wisely recognizes that a number of goods are implicated in the state’s posi-
tion with respect to family forms, and that these goods can conºict with 
one another.50 Because of this, Galston focuses on the single good he be-
lieves should be paramount in fashioning the state’s family policy—
children’s well-being: 
With regard to what is called “family policy,” here is my ques-
tion: What would we do if we really want to create a society that 
puts children ªrst, that allows every child the maximum feasible 
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scope for the development or actualization of talents and per-
sonal relationships and the ability to make use of those developed 
talents and relationships in a way that is personally gratifying as 
well as socially beneªcial? If we take that question seriously, 
many other worthy aims may have to give way to some extent, 
which include aims that men and women, as parents, may value. 
 
It is my holding that there is no necessary harmony, at all times 
and in all circumstances, between the well-being of parents and 
the well-being of children. Families, however conªgured, are an 
area in which interests both overlap and conºict in signiªcant 
ways.51 
Having posed the question of which family structures best further chil-
dren’s welfare, Galston considers the link between the rising rates of chil-
dren being raised outside of marriage and children’s well-being. He ar-
gues, “[a]s I read the evidence, which is of course eminently contestable, 
divorce does matter even after you take income into account. The same con-
clusion is reached when looking at teen parenthood matters.”52 Galston 
then proposes a multi-pronged initiative to deal with improving children’s 
well-being, which includes state support for marriage.53 In making the 
case for his initiative, Galston argues against the view that marriage is a 
failed social institution that the state should abandon. In his words, mar-
riage 
is not a panacea, but it is a vital part of the solution. In at least a 
majority of cases, marriage can make a positive contribution, not 
only to the well-being of children, but also to the well-being of 
their parents. 
 
Does this represent nostalgia? Does it imply the reafªrmation of 
patriarchy? On the contrary: it means the simple recognition that 
for economic, emotional and developmental reasons, marriage is 
the most promising institution yet devised for raising children 
and forming caring, competent, responsible adults. . . . I am deeply 
skeptical that the abolition of marriage, with all of its imperfec-
tions, can possibly yield better lives, or a better society for our 
children.54 
Galston’s discussion offers some strong insights. Galston eloquently 
recognizes what Warner’s account omits: a vigorous liberal democracy 
should be able to privilege some relationships over others for important pub-
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lic ends. And certainly creating a stable environment for children is such 
an important end. All other things being equal, stable family relationships 
are better for children than unstable or nonexistent relationships. Further, 
while many of the greater difªculties associated with single-parent fami-
lies can be attributed to lack of adequate legal and social supports,55 hav-
ing the emotional and ªnancial resources of two loving adults available 
to a child, again, all other things being equal, is better than having the re-
sources of just one. 
Yet all other things are seldom equal. By considering children’s well-
being alone among all the other important goods implicated by family pol-
icy, Galston’s framing of the discussion elides some of the most difªcult 
and important issues that family policy raises. Galston certainly is correct 
that there is often a tradeoff among important goods, including children’s 
welfare, and that, in assessing this tradeoff, children’s interests should be 
weighed heavily. To take from this that children’s well-being is the only 
good to be considered in crafting family policy, however, is seriously my-
opic. It should not be the case that any gain to children’s welfare, no mat-
ter how small, should trump serious losses to other important goods. To 
do so would be to fetishize children’s interests above the range of other im-
portant goods for which a liberal democracy should strive. Moreover, with-
out considering the other important interests at stake, Galston cannot begin 
to assess the relevant degree of tradeoffs. 
In fact, Galston’s proposal to beneªt children would impinge on a num-
ber of important goods. Among the most important of these is sex equal-
ity. The institution of heterosexual marriage that Galston seeks to foster 
in order to promote children’s welfare has historically been linked, and con-
tinues to be linked, with women’s enduring inequality in society. As Mar-
tha Fineman bluntly puts it, public policy that encourages marriage for the 
sake of children therefore constitutes the state’s willingness to sacriªce 
women’s interests for children’s.56 Galston’s framing of family policy only 
in terms of children’s well-being therefore prevents him from asking a series 
of questions that might better reconcile this good with sex equality and 
other important goods at stake: Are there other family structures or other 
ways to organize social life that would give children the beneªts and ade-
quate ªnancial resources that marriage currently does? Are there ways that 
marriage could be organized to reduce or eliminate sex inequality, or are 
there other forms of adult associations that would do the same while still 
supporting the well-being of children? To what other goods should fam-
ily policy be aimed besides those that marriage encompasses? 
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 See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 Harv. Women’s L.J. 19, 34–35 
(1995) (arguing that lack of social and economic support for single parent families, rather 
than inherent deªciencies in this family form, creates disadvantages for children raised in 
these families). 
56
 See Fineman, supra note 15, at 87–88. 
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D. The Council on Family Law—Marriage as a Form that Combines the 
State’s Interests in Raising Children, Bonding Sexual Difference, and 
Protecting Women 
In its recent report The Future of Family Law: Law and the Marriage 
Crisis in North America, the Council on Family Law agrees with Profes-
sor Galston that marriage should continue to be the state’s privileged in-
stitution for relationships between adults, but grounds this conclusion on 
a somewhat different rationale.57 The Council’s report argues that the goal 
of marriage should be to recognize “the fundamental importance of the sex-
ual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female, men and women 
often have sex, babies often result, and those babies, on average, seem to 
do better when their mother and father cooperate in their care.”58 This under-
standing of marriage as the promotion of a stable framework for biologi-
cal parents procreating and raising children, the report argues, should be 
retained by the state.59 
The report therefore decries proposals like Fineman’s and Warner’s, 
which argue for state disengagement from marriage. Sounding a chord simi-
lar to Galston’s, the Council asserts that such arguments “den[y] the state’s 
legitimate and serious interest in marriage as our most important child-
protecting social institution and as an institution that helps protect and 
sustain liberal democracy.”60 The Council also argues against proposals 
that seek to expand the category of relationships privileged by the state be-
yond married heterosexual couples. According to the Council, doing so 
would unwisely “celebrate relationship diversity” to the exclusion of fos-
tering the important goals that have traditionally been supported in mar-
riage.61 Further, to treat relationships that have not been formalized as the 
equivalent of marriage, the Council argues, would not only undercut cou-
ples’ own intent regarding the effects of their relationships, it would also fail 
to encourage couples to enter into formal commitments, and the state would 
therefore miss an important opportunity to encourage the stability of these 
relationships and the welfare of any children who result from them.62 The 
Council argues that advocates who support the state awarding privileges 
to a broader category of relationships than marriage miss “the speciªcity 
of marriage as a form of life struggling with the unique challenges of bond-
ing sexual difference and caring for children who are the products of un-
ions.”63 
 
                                                                                                                             
57
 Council on Family Law, supra note 12. 
58
 Id. at 13. 
59
 See id. at 40–41. 
60
 Id. at 6. 
61
 Id. at 40. 
62
 See id. at 24–25. 
63
 Id. at 21. 
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The Council makes valuable points about the important role the state 
can play in creating a stable environment that fosters the well-being of 
children by formalizing and privileging relationships such as marriage.64 
And certainly the Council’s focus on children’s welfare is normatively ap-
pealing. However, it is less successful in following through with its focus 
on this important good. Many same-sex couples, like many heterosexual 
couples, have children. And the children of these same-sex parents, like 
the children of opposite-sex parents, beneªt from the stability of their par-
ents’ relationships. Given this, it makes sense for the state to seek to sta-
bilize these relationships with the same supports that the Council argues 
work so well with opposite-sex couples. 
In addition, by focusing only on the bonding of “sexual difference”65 
(in the Council’s words) and supporting children’s welfare, and therefore 
encouraging the state to privilege heterosexual marital relationships to 
the exclusion of other intimate adult relationships, the Council disregards a 
number of other important goods and principles. Among these, the Council 
ignores the other goods that relationships between adults can foster, such 
as the caretaking of adults accomplished within these relationships. While 
the Council criticizes those who seek to extend the state’s support beyond 
heterosexual marriage on the ground that such policy advocates too nar-
rowly focus on “values such as commitment, mutual support and the rest” 
in the absence of childrearing,66 it ignores the important mutual support 
and related goods that offer powerful reasons for the state to privilege rela-
tionships that promote these goods, even in the absence of children. This 
is the case whether or not these relationships further the other values that 
the Council believes are crucial to the state’s protection of marriage. 
The Council’s approach to state support of adult relationships also 
ignores a cluster of important values and principles that go to the heart of 
liberalism’s suspicion about the use of state power and its staunch insis-
tence on a limited state. These values include a respect for individuals’ 
choosing their own life course, a belief that citizens’ freedom will gener-
ally redound to the health of the polity, a profound vigilance against stan-
dardization by the state, and the concern that the majority will use state 
power to impose its own beliefs on the minority without valid reasons to 
do so.67 The Council’s argument for imposing a single, privileged vision of 
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 See also Scott, supra note 11, for an eloquent defense of the state’s retention of 
some formalized civil status for relationships among adults, on the ground that such a 
status helps stabilize these relationships. 
65
 Council on Family Law, supra note 12, at 21. 
66
 Id. 
67
 John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, set out in his essay On Liberty, is probably the 
most well-known liberal explication of the legitimate limits of the state. See John Stuart 
Mill, On Liberty 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) 
(arguing that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mem-
ber of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”). Likewise, Mill’s 
defense of individuality and the beneªts to society of allowing freedom and experimenta-
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the good life on citizens’ personal lives raises warning ºags with respect 
to all of these values. Taking them seriously counsels that the state’s privi-
leging of particular courses of life over others should occur only for very 
good reasons and, when this privileging occurs, it should be handled in a 
manner that seeks to preserve as much liberty as possible for its citizens. 
Or, as the same sentiment is more colorfully phrased by Michael Warner, 
“Get over yourself. Put a wig on before you judge. . . . [Y]ou stand to learn 
most from the people you think are beneath you.”68 The Council’s narrow 
vision of the relationships entitled to state support, and its seeking to jus-
tify this narrow vision based on tradition and religion, are an uneasy ªt 
with this set of values.69 By the same token, the Council’s depiction of one 
type of sexuality—heterosexual sexuality—as the preferred form of sexual-
ity for state support sits uncomfortably with these tenets.70 
The Council’s position that the state should support marriage to the 
exclusion of all other relationships also ignores liberalism’s deep recog-
nition of the limits on the institutional competence of the state to accom-
plish particular ends—what might be called liberal humility. Liberal hu-
mility requires the recognition that the state has a limited ability to en-
courage citizens to acquire and formalize healthy caretaking relation-
ships. While the state can establish certain institutional preconditions and 
incentives for couples to make relationships work, ultimately whether or not 
healthy relationships will develop and be sustained has a great deal to do 
with sheer chance and characteristics of the individuals involved that are 
 
                                                                                                                             
tion remain classic evocations of this cluster of values. See id. at 74, 120–21, 128.  
68
 Warner, supra note 15, at 35. 
69
 The Council’s argument that the value of family diversity should not trump “what 
tradition, religion, and even now the social sciences tell us about family formation, parent-
ing, and children’s well-being,” also raise concerns that the Council is seeking to justify 
the use of state power to further its own private comprehensive views. Council on Fam-
ily Law, supra note 12, at 41. Certainly liberalism decries the view that tradition and re-
ligion can themselves justify the exclusion of citizens from institutions that the Council 
concedes are basic to society and a fundamental means through which the state funnels re-
sources. One of the fundamental breaks between liberalism and the patriarchal political 
theory that preceded it was over the view that religion and tradition are themselves ade-
quate rationales on which to premise state action. 
70
 In several places, the Council’s report argues that the state should support only het-
erosexual relationships because only those relationships, in which children are born unex-
pectedly, “can cause immense personal and social damage.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 13 
(“From this basic human reality arises the need for the wider society to direct immense 
energy into helping manage the reality of individual men’s and women’s desire for sex and 
intimacy in ways that ultimately protect them, their children, and the interests of the com-
munity.”). While this rationale supports the view that marriage is a corrective institution to 
forestall the damage that would otherwise occur in dangerous heterosexual relationships, 
other parts of the report indicate that the Council believes that heterosexuality is more natural 
and more preferable than homosexuality. Marriage, in this view, is less a corrective institu-
tion than a desired end for citizens. See id. at 12 (“Conjugal marriage cannot celebrate an 
inªnite array of sexual or intimate choices as equally desirable or valid.”); see also id. at 
12–13 (“Marriage, like the economy, is one of the basic institutions of civil society. It pro-
vides an evolving form of life that helps men and women negotiate the sex divide, forge an 
intimate community of life, and provide a stable social setting for their children.”). 
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beyond the state’s ability to affect. Ignoring these limits on the state’s com-
petence can cause the state to over-invest resources in an institution that it 
has only moderate power to affect. The state could, of course, still provide 
sufªcient incentives to cause citizens to enter into and remain in relation-
ships in which they are miserable, conºict is high, and little caretaking oc-
curs. As Linda McClain points out, however, these are not the relationships 
that the government has an interest in supporting, since these are not the 
relationships that produce the goods in which a liberal democracy has a 
stake.71 The state’s limited competence in this area makes the question 
posed by Martha Fineman even more pressing: should children who, 
through no fault of their own, are born or are raised outside of wedlock be 
deprived of state support,72 particularly where the state’s lack of support 
will only have a limited impact on whether future children are born into the 
marriage institution? 
Further, it should be recognized that even if eligible citizens seek to 
marry, entering and remaining in this institution will be beyond the control 
of many. For example, one partner may simply decide that he or she no 
longer loves the other partner and leave, with no fault on the part of the 
other partner. The state’s investing its resources only in marriage means 
that this wider group of citizens, many through no fault of their own, will 
be ineligible for these beneªts. 
What’s more, those citizens left out of the institution of marriage will 
likely be those who most need state subsidies. Because of economies of 
scale, adults in live-in relationships generally have an easier time ªnancially 
than those who live alone.73 Distributing resources to adults in relation-
ships therefore is generally a regressive measure based on need. Further, 
insofar as two-parent families have particular advantages that make them 
more conducive to rearing healthy, stable children than single-parent fami-
lies, distributing privileges to dual-parent families is also regressive based 
on need.74 As Judith Stacey argues, “The more eggs and raiments our society 
 
                                                                                                                             
71
 See McClain, supra note 23, at 117, 129 (“But quality of family of life is impor-
tant: just as healthy marriage may promote adult and child well-being, unhealthy marriage 
(for example, high-conºict marriage) may hinder it.”). 
72
 See Fineman, supra note 15, at 67, 110–12. 
73
 See Ann Crittenden, The Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important 
Job in the World is Still the Least Valued 150 (2001) (demonstrating that “two house-
holds are much more expensive than one”: “In one study researchers found that after di-
vorce a family will need about one-third more income in order to maintain its previous 
standard of living. According to another researcher, if a family’s total income stays the 
same, ‘the couple can expect a drop in standard of living between 21 and 26%, depending 
on the number of children and how they are divided between the parents.’”). 
74
 Distributing resources generally to families with children, however, accords with 
distributing based on need. As Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi demonstrate, “hav-
ing a child is now the single best predictor that a woman will end up in ªnancial collapse.” 
Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-
Class Mothers and Fathers are Going Broke 6 (2003) (emphasis omitted). In their 
words, “married couples with children are more than twice as likely to ªle for bankruptcy 
as their childless counterparts.” Id. They are also 75% more likely to be late in paying their 
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chooses to place in the family baskets of the married, the hungrier and shab-
bier will be the lives of the vast numbers of adults and dependents who, 
whether by fate, misfortune, or volition, will remain outside the gates.”75 
The principle that societal resources should be distributed based on need, 
although not always followed, is certainly well enough grounded in liberal 
democracies that it should be undercut only for good reason. 
Finally, the Council’s proposal risks impeding marriage’s movement 
toward sex equality. At common law, marriage was an institution premised 
on the hierarchical ordering of husband and wife,76 in which different rights 
and responsibilities were assigned to husbands and wives based on gender. 
Since the 1970s, and the recognition by the Supreme Court that the United 
States Constitution protects against sex discrimination,77 marriage has 
gradually been stripped of this explicit hierarchical legal ordering, as well as 
of its gender-based legal duties.78 The Council’s insistence on retaining 
marriage’s gender-based entry requirements and its determined attention 
to the difference between genders maintains the underpinnings of marriage’s 
gender-dependent origins.79 Indeed, the Council’s description of the political 
and natural order as containing a gap between women and men that must 
be bridged echoes this same outmoded logic of gender classiªcation.80 
 
                                                                                                                             
credit card bills than a family with no children and far more likely to face foreclosure on 
their homes. Id. at 6–7. 
75
 Stacey, supra note 14, at 344. Stacey adds: “In my view, this is an unacceptably steep 
and undemocratic social price for whatever marginal increases in marital stability might be 
achieved for those admitted to the charmed circle.” Id. 
76
 William Blackstone, who wrote a treatise on the laws of England that was widely con-
sidered authoritative in the United States, described the institution of marriage at common 
law in the following way: “By marriage,” he wrote, 
the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal exis-
tence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, 
she performs every thing . . . . Upon this principle, of an union of person in hus-
band and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either 
of them acquire by the marriage. 
William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 430 (1825); see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 
130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“So ªrmly ªxed was this sentiment in the founders 
of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman 
had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and repre-
sentative in the social state . . . .”). 
77
 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
78
 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14–15 (1975) (rejecting the “notion” 
that “generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials” 
and noting that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of 
the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”) (citation omit-
ted).  
79
 Cf. Scott, supra note 11, at 237–38 (arguing that allowing same-sex couples to marry 
“would clarify that marriage enjoys a special legal status because of its tangible and intan-
gible social beneªts and not because of its moral superiority as a family form that pre-
serves traditional gender roles”). 
80
 See, e.g., Council on Family Law, supra note 12, at 12–13 (“Marriage, like the 
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Likewise, the Council’s argument that marriage should be limited to 
heterosexuals to protect women on account of the vulnerability they experi-
ence from childrearing and childbearing must be taken with signiªcant cau-
tion.81 The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out that reliance on gender 
classiªcations “carr[ies] the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about 
the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special protection.”82 For 
this reason, it has counseled that where the state’s “ameliorative purposes 
are as well served by a gender-neutral classiªcation as one that gender 
classiªes and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, 
the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”83 In the case 
of marriage, women’s interest in equality would be better served by an insti-
tution that protects those who enter it in a sex-neutral way, detached from 
notions that women are in need of special protection. In addition, to the 
extent that homosexual relationships do not replicate these same patterns 
of vulnerability,84 the state’s interest in sex equality supports including and 
encouraging same-sex relationships rather than denying them recognition 
and rights. 
In sum, each of these positions—Martha Fineman’s, Michael Warner’s, 
William Galston’s, and the Council on Family Law’s—focuses on important 
goods and principles that a vigorous liberal democratic polity should seek to 
draw upon. Yet none of them steps back enough to pay adequate attention 
to the range of important goods and principles at stake. Considering this 
broader range of goods and principles together yields a more complicated—
but ultimately a more satisfying—picture of what the state’s role should 
be with respect to adults’ relationships. 
II. The “Supportive State” and Relationships Between Adults 
What stance would the state take on relationships between adults if it 
considered the broader range of important goods and principles implicated 
in intimate adult relationships? These goods include not only principles 
of freedom and equal regard, but also furthering caretaking and human 
development for children and adults, equal opportunity for all citizens, sex 
equality, and civic fellowship. This Part sets forth an approach that takes 
 
                                                                                                                             
economy, is one of the basic institutions of civic society. It provides an evolving form of 
life that helps men and women negotiate the sex divide, forge an intimate community of 
life, and provide a stable social setting for their children.”); id. at 40 (“Marriage is the 
complex cultural site for opposite-sex bonding.”); id. at 41 (“[Marriage] sustains a complex 
form of social interdependency between men and women.”).  
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 See id. at 12. 
82
 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 685–87 (1973) (condemning state’s reliance on outmoded or overbroad stereotypes). 
83
 Orr, 440 U.S. at 283. 
84
 See Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s 
Caring for Justice, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 477, 510 (1999) (citing studies showing that les-
bian couples generally do not organize their relationship on a provider-homemaker model). 
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into account this array of important principles and interests, seeking to 
give each due weight, as well as to ameliorate the tension among them.85 
To begin sorting out these matters, let me point out that there are ac-
tually two separate but related issues that must be considered with respect to 
the state’s approach to relationships. The ªrst issue is whether the state 
should recognize relationships between adults for the purpose of assigning 
rights and responsibilities between these adults. The second is whether the 
state should privilege relationships between adults, in the sense that those 
who participate in these relationships should receive either beneªts from 
or rights against the state or third parties. I argue that both of these issues 
should be answered in the afªrmative, although the ªrst issue is an easier 
one to answer than the second. 
A. State Recognition of Adult-Adult Relationships 
When it comes to whether the state should recognize relationships 
between adults for the purpose of assigning rights and responsibilities be-
tween them, the answer seems to me to be clearly “yes.” The interdependent 
nature of intimate relationships between adults, particularly when they are 
long-term, can create large economic inequities and imbalances of power 
in the absence of regulation. These issues are best addressed through laws 
that, at a minimum, establish a fair default position between the parties to 
the relationship. 
For example, in couples who have children, one member often assumes 
more household and childrearing responsibilities—generally, the woman—
while the other member assumes the role of primary breadwinner—
traditionally, the man. In the absence of laws regulating intimate relation-
ships, under rules governing property in the majority of states, the bread-
winner is legally entitled to his or her own earnings.86 This leaves the pri-
mary caretaker, who has generally received fewer earnings than the bread-
winner or no earnings (depending on whether she also worked outside of the 
home), signiªcantly disadvantaged by her contribution to the family. Be-
cause she has invested her human capital in the home rather than the la-
bor market, and the skills she develops are not easily transferable outside of 
that realm, she will also be less well positioned to rejoin the labor market 
compared to her partner, who will have invested his human capital in ad-
vancing his career and improving his salary.87 In the face of these inequi-
 
                                                                                                                             
85
 In her recently published book The Place of Families, Linda McClain offers a thought-
ful account of how the state should regulate families in order to foster their and their mem-
bers’ capacity, equality, and responsibility. See McClain, supra note 23. In doing so, she, 
too, argues that liberalism must recognize the multiple goods at stake in the relationship 
between families and the state. 
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 See generally Leslie J. Harris, Lee E. Teitelbaum & June Carbone, Family Law 
35–39 (3d ed. 2005) (describing common law system of property ownership). 
87
 See generally Paula England & George Farkas, Households, Employment, 
and Gender: A Social, Economic and Demographic View 44–45, 55–56 (1986) (set-
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ties, a state’s failure to establish such laws, as Mary Shanley recognizes, 
would abandon the state’s interest in securing justice and equality in these 
relationships.88 In this way, the state’s failing to act could encourage those in 
relationships to turn away from caretaking that supports their family’s 
welfare in order to look out for themselves ªnancially. 
Martha Fineman argues that considerations of justice and equality dic-
tate the opposite conclusion—state disengagement.89 She asserts that the 
state’s withdrawal from regulating adult-adult relationships “would mean 
that we are taking gender equality seriously.”90 According to Fineman: 
If people want their relationships to have consequences, they 
should bargain for them, and this is as true with sexual afªliates 
as with others who interact in complex, ongoing interrelation-
ships, such as employers and employees. This would mean that 
sexual afªliates (formerly labeled husband and wife) would be 
regulated by the terms of their individualized agreements, with no 
special rules governing fairness and no unique review or monitor-
ing of the negotiation process.91 
Fineman glosses over serious difªculties, however, in suggesting that a 
contractual regime will result in fair and equal agreements between par-
ties in relationships. First, she fails to take into account the ways in which 
those entering into a relationship based on affective ties may not be look-
ing solely after their own interests rather than the other person’s (and the 
state may not want to encourage them to be solely self-regarding). As a re-
sult, a “sexual afªliate” may agree to an unfair contract. Furthermore, the 
courses of lives and relationships are often so difªcult to predict that con-
tracts entered into ex ante may not fairly and justly resolve what occurs 
ex post. In addition, in a regime of contract, those in a weaker bargaining 
position—traditionally women—will be less able to negotiate favorable 
terms for themselves, which can lead to further inequality both in the course 
of the relationship and also if and when it ends. For these reasons, the 
state’s establishment of a fair default position—for example, requiring that 
earnings by either partner during the relationship be owned jointly by the 
partners—is a better alternative than requiring that partners bargain indi-
vidually. 
Moreover, in a regime governed exclusively by contract, even those 
who negotiate unfavorable contracts may be more fortunate than those 
who negotiate no contracts. For some, the failure to enter into a contract 
will be because they cannot afford a lawyer; for others, this will be because 
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 See Shanley, supra note 27, at 16. 
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 See Fineman, supra note 15, at 134. 
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the motivation to express one’s love publicly, which many would say is their 
motivation to enter marriage,92 would not similarly impel them to enter into 
a contract to protect themselves against their partner. If and when these 
relationships end, the partners would have no contractual claims against 
one another, again to the detriment of primary caretakers, since they would 
have no claim to income earned by their partners through the joint efforts 
of the family.93 A regime in which the state recognizes relationships among 
adults for the purpose of apportioning rights and obligations fairly among 
them therefore furthers the ends of fairness and justice. 
Of course, the state could assign such rights and obligations without 
providing couples with a route to formalize these relationships. For example, 
the state could assign rights and responsibilities based on the functional 
characteristics of the relationship without considering whether the relation-
ship was ever formalized. The American Law Institute’s Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution proposes that such a scheme should apply to un-
married cohabitants; 94 in a regime in which civil marriage and other formal-
ized commitments between adults were eliminated, a similar scheme could 
be applied to all couples. Under such an approach, what would matter in 
assigning such rights would be the couple’s functional characteristics—
how long they lived together, whether they had children together, etc.—
rather than whether they had formalized their relationship. For example, 
progressively more property sharing might be required of couples who lived 
together for longer periods of time or who had children together, regardless 
of whether the couple had made a formal commitment to stay together. 
In my view, however, eliminating a civil route for formalizing rela-
tionships would be a mistake for two reasons. First, in entering into a mar-
riage, participants indicate their assent to a speciªc formal status that comes 
with a set of enforceable legal rights and responsibilities. This formaliza-
tion therefore helps to identify the intent of its members and their own 
understandings with respect to the intended primacy and permanency of the 
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 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–55 (Mass. 2003) (“Civil 
marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly 
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, ªdelity, and family. 
‘It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not politi-
cal faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.’” (quoting Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965))). 
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 It might be argued, however, that although some individuals who enter into conjugal 
relationships may fare worse in the event of a break-up if civil marriage were eliminated, 
many other individuals would fare better because, in the absence of such recognition from 
the state, they would cease to enter into conjugal relationships. And certainly Fineman and 
other commentators have suggested that women as a group would fare better if they avoided 
entering into marriage or marriage-like relationships with men. See Fineman, supra note 
15, at 135. Whether or not this is the case, my strong hunch is that ending civil recognition 
will have little effect on the numbers of people who enter into conjugal relationships—they 
will simply do so without the imprimatur of the state, or its protections. 
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 See Am. Law Inst., supra note 13, §§ 6.01, 6.03–6.06 (providing that unmarried co-
habitants who share a residence and life together for a signiªcant period of time be subject 
to property division and spousal support, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary). 
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relationship. And surely such understandings should be relevant in determin-
ing the default rules that apply to that particular relationship.95 For exam-
ple, a commitment to a permanent relationship should be pertinent to the 
state’s determination of how long income should be redistributed between 
parties who have separated. 
Second, the state’s making available a route through which citizens 
can formally commit to the permanency and depth of their relationship 
serves the state’s interest in increasing the stability of familial caretaking 
relationships.96 As Elizabeth Scott thoughtfully explains: 
[M]arriage is an institution that has a clear social meaning and is 
regulated by a complex set of social norms that promote coop-
eration between spouses—norms such as ªdelity, loyalty, trust, 
reciprocity, and sharing. These norms express the unique impor-
tance of the marriage relationship. They are embodied in well-
understood community expectations about appropriate marital 
behavior that are internalized by individuals entering marriage 
. . . . 
 
The social norms and conventions surrounding marriage inºuence 
spousal behavior in a variety of ways that reinforce the stability 
of the relationship. For example, the wedding ceremony and ac-
companying traditions can be understood as a public announce-
ment of an important change in status. The ceremony usually in-
cludes the couple’s exchange of vows and declaration of com-
mitment before friends and family. Symbolically at least, this 
represents an expression of each spouse’s willingness to be held 
accountable for the faithful performance of marital duties, not only 
by the other spouse, but also by the broader community. Marital 
status also signals to the community that spouses are not available 
for other intimate relationships, and thus discourages outsiders 
interested in intimacy from approaching married persons . . . . 
 
The formality of marital status, together with the requirement of 
legal action for both entry into marriage and divorce, clariªes the 
meaning of the commitment that couples are making and under-
scores its seriousness . . . . The package of substantive legal ob-
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ligations that goes with the formal status of marriage serves in-
dependently to promote stability in the relationship.97 
Providing a route for adults to formalize their commitments therefore in-
creases the likelihood that they will provide one another the care that each 
needs, establish a stable relationship in the event of children, and try hard 
during tough times to weather difªculties with their partners.98 
B. State Privileging of (Some) Adult-Adult Relationships 
I have argued that the supportive state should recognize relationships 
between adults and impose, at the least, default rights and responsibilities 
among participants in such relationships for the purpose of seeking to ensure 
equality and fairness, as well as to foster caretaking while preserving 
gender equality. The issue of whether the supportive state should seek to 
privilege such relationships is a much tougher issue for a liberal democ-
racy. In my view, the answer should be “yes” because of the goods that these 
relationships further. These privileges, however, must be limited in particular 
ways since they stand in tension with other important liberal goods and 
values, such as principles of liberty and equal regard.99 Part of the challenge 
of a more robust liberalism that recognizes a richer diversity of goods is 
to seek a course of action that ameliorates the tensions among these var-
ied goods to the extent that is possible. In what follows, I set out four prin-
ciples for the supportive state’s treatment of adults’ relationships that, 
together, seek to accomplish this purpose. 
1. Freedom To Enter into Consensual Relationships 
First, liberalism’s great respect for individuals forming and carrying 
out their own life plans requires that the state allow individuals the free-
dom to engage, or not engage, in consensual relationships with others. The 
right to determine one’s own personal relationships free from interference by 
the state is central to liberalism’s respect for individual self-determina-
tion.100 John Stuart Mill’s counsel that society beneªts from allowing dif-
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ferent “experiments of living” to ºourish also supports the state’s interest 
in ensuring such freedom.101 Under this principle, for example, a citizen 
whose vision of the good life is to have sexual relationships with as many 
other citizens as possible should be able to fulªll that vision without inter-
ference by the state (barring issues such as public health concerns), regard-
less of whether the majority’s own private views of morality condemn such 
action. This would prohibit state criminal statutes still on the books in sev-
eral states that outlaw fornication and cohabitation outside of marriage.102 
2. Encouragement of (a Broad Range of) Long-Term 
Caretaking Relationships 
Second, although the liberal state must tolerate all consensual rela-
tionships, it need not give all such relationships a level playing ªeld. It is 
true, as Michael Warner argues, that the liberal democratic state should not 
favor some relationships over others based on citizens’ private notions of 
morality.103 It can and should, however, seek to support relationships that 
further important public goods in which the liberal state has a legitimate 
interest. Among the most important of these is caretaking. Without mini-
mizing the violence and other harm that sometimes occurs in relationships 
between adults, or ignoring the sex inequality that has marked heterosex-
ual relationships, the crux of the matter is that dependency is an inevita-
ble fact of life for adults as well as children, and a liberal state must contend 
with that fact. Because of its interest in the health, well-being, and dig-
nity of its citizens, the liberal state has a vital interest in the success of 
relationships that foster caretaking, and should provide these relation-
ships with the institutional support that will help them ºourish. 
Given that a primary reason for the state to privilege adult intimate 
relationships is caretaking, the state has an interest in supporting a con-
siderably broader range of relationships than the heterosexual couples who 
now choose to formally marry. The state has an interest in supporting, for 
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example, relationships of nonmonogamous couples, or, at the opposite end 
of the spectrum, those whose relationships are not sexual, insofar as these 
relationships foster caretaking. By the same token, the state also has an 
interest in supporting caretaking in family groupings that involve more than 
two adults.104 Thus, the state has valid reasons to support all of the following 
horizontal relationships involving caretaking: two elderly sisters who live 
together and take care of one another, a nonmonogamous homosexual cou-
ple, a commune of ªve adults who live together with their children, and a 
heterosexual married couple. 
3. Limits on the Privileges Available to Long-Term 
Caretaking Relationships 
Third, promoting the health and stability of relationships among adults 
is only one goal that a ºourishing liberal democracy should pursue, and 
only one of many principles that should affect the state’s decision mak-
ing. State distribution of privileges in favor of these relationships there-
fore has to be weighed against alternative principles of distribution, includ-
ing distribution based on need. As I pointed out before, considerations of 
need will often conºict with distributing privileges to adults in long-term 
relationships. Further, the recognition of the limits on the state’s and in-
dividuals’ abilities to ensure the existence and stability of relationships must 
also be factored into the state’s family policy. 
These considerations should cause the state to limit the privileges that 
support these relationships in two speciªc ways. First, the state’s seeking 
to aid caretaking relationships between adults cannot undercut the state’s 
responsibility to ensure that all its citizens have the means and opportunity 
to pursue digniªed lives. This means, at a minimum, as Martha Fineman 
argues, that a just society should seek to deliver basic social goods such as 
health care to everyone in society, regardless of family membership.105 Inso-
far as the state distributes these goods based on marital status, it neglects 
its most basic responsibilities. 
Second, the state should limit privileges for relationships to those tied 
to the speciªc public good in which the state has a legitimate interest—
for example, caretaking or sex equality.106 Singling out families for more 
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generalized favorable treatment—while it might still further the goal of 
encouraging and supporting families—stands in tension with principles of 
fairness and equal regard among all citizens, both those within and those 
not in such families, particularly insofar as it redistributes economic re-
sources to those who are, on average, better off. Under my proposed princi-
ple, the state could allow caretaking leaves from work or special immi-
gration privileges for the partners of citizens, but not general tax breaks 
for those in caretaking relationships that are unrelated to the extra ex-
penses incurred in caretaking. Thus the state would have little justiªcation 
for funnelling general economic support to those in adult-adult relation-
ships, given that these adults, on average, do better ªnancially due to the 
economies of scale of living together. In contrast, economic redistribution to 
caretaker-dependent relationships could be better justiªed by the consid-
eration of the cost to caretakers of caring for dependents, including the 
interruption from working continuously in the paid workforce. 
One important way in which the state can legitimately foster relation-
ships among adults that conform to this principle is by, as I suggested 
earlier, providing a civil route through which adults can formalize their 
commitment to others. As Elizabeth Scott notes, formal commitments 
increase the likelihood that a relationship will last.107 They also serve as 
an expressive vehicle for the state to announce its support for stable care-
taking relationships without redistributing tangible privileges in favor of 
such relationships and, hence, away from those who might need them 
more. The state’s endorsement of such formal commitments is still not, of 
course, without cost to those who do not enter them: to the extent that the 
state endorses such commitments, those who do not enter into them may 
feel a lack of societal respect, or even societal disapprobation. However, 
given the importance of caretaking relationships, the stability that such 
formalization contributes to these relationships in my view outweighs the 
costs of this potential stigmatization. 
 
                                                                                                                             
If not, should the law be repealed or fundamentally revised? 
 
Second question: Do relationships matter? 
If the law’s objectives are sound, are the relationships included in the law impor-
tant or relevant to the law’s objectives? 
 
Third question: If relationships matter, can individuals be permitted to designate 
the relevant relationships themselves? 
Could the law allow individuals to choose which of their close personal relation-
ships they want to be subject to the particular law? 
 
Fourth question: If relationships matter, and self-designation is not feasible or ap-
propriate, is there a better way to include relationships? 
Id. at xii–xiii.  
107
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4. Guarding Against Injury to Other Important Goods 
Fourth, in privileging caretaking relationships between adults, the state 
must also seek to remedy the negative consequences to public goods as-
sociated with these relationships. Three of these possible consequences bear 
particular attention: (1) increased sex inequality; (2) increased inequality 
of wealth and opportunity; and (3) disengagement from civic life. I discuss 
each in turn. 
a. Sex Inequality 
Any proposals that the state should promote intimate caretaking rela-
tionships must deal with the fact that heterosexual relationships, as well 
as the institution of marriage, have been deeply intertwined with women’s 
continued gender inequality. Leaving current political realities aside, the 
state might, of course, deal with this troubling association by privileging 
only those long-term caretaking relationships that do not involve hetero-
sexual relationships, such as homosexual relationships or platonic relation-
ships. Alternatively, and far more palatable politically, the state could privi-
lege heterosexual relationships along with other relationships, at the same 
time that it seeks to increase the equality within these relationships. 
One way to pursue this latter goal would be for the state to adopt poli-
cies that encourage the shared caretaking of children within families, as 
much gender inequality is associated with women assuming the greater por-
tion of childrearing responsibilities.108 To accomplish this goal, the state 
could adopt models of public support for caretaking that encourage men 
to take an equal role. For example, requiring that employers adopt family 
leave and ºex-time policies that can be taken by parents sharing child-
care between them, rather than policies that are limited to full-time care-
givers, would encourage shared caretaking. Public schools, too, could play a 
role in this endeavor, teaching children that both fathers and mothers can 
have equal roles in nurturing their children, and helping them to under-
stand the importance of these caretaking tasks. In Anita Shreve’s words, “the 
old home-economics courses that used to teach girls how to cook and sew 
might give way to the new home economics: teaching girls and boys how 
to combine work and parenting.”109 
b. Inequality of Wealth and Opportunity 
Second, with respect to inequality of opportunity, the state’s encour-
agement of tighter family ties runs the risk that wealth will be more tightly 
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held within particular families’ hands, therefore increasing disparities of 
wealth and consequently, opportunities across families.110 What this threat to 
equality calls for, however, is not state efforts to loosen family ties, but 
rather efforts to lessen the disparities of wealth and opportunity that may 
result from these ties through mechanisms such as taxation. The state’s 
goal should be to reduce, although probably not eliminate, disparities in 
wealth passed on between generations. As Michael Walzer argues, there are 
signiªcant reasons to allow family members to express their love through 
bequests to family members, as well as signiªcant reasons to tax these be-
quests for reasons of equality and funding legitimate state expenditures.111 
Walzer concludes, rightly in my view, that the state should moderate be-
tween these goals by giving some weight to both when determining the 
extent of taxation of such gifts.112 The state, in turn, should use these taxes 
and other means to ensure that all citizens have the ªnancial means and 
education to achieve (at the very least) some basic equality of opportunity, 
even when their families cannot provide this without aid. 
c. Families as a Respite, Not an Island 
Finally, the state should also seek to encourage families to serve as a 
source of support, but not be islands unto themselves. The social circles 
of adult Americans have narrowed dramatically in the past decades. In-
creasingly, adults are turning toward their families and away from devel-
oping the close ties with friends and broader social networks in neighbor-
hoods and communities that a healthy liberal democracy requires.113 
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Some substantial part of this change appears to be fueled by the in-
creasing time bind in which American families ªnd themselves.114 Moth-
ers’ increased labor force participation,115 combined with the increasingly 
long hours that all employees work,116 as well as longer commutes,117 place 
American families in a far greater time crunch than their European coun-
terparts.118 The inºux of women into the workforce in the last four dec-
ades means that families have added ten to twenty-nine hours working out-
side the home per week.119 However, recent time analysis studies suggest 
that adults in families still spend roughly the same number of hours each 
week caring for children as they did forty years ago.120 This leaves parents 
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far less time for socializing with other adults and for community activi-
ties than they once had.121 This time crunch is particularly evident among 
the highly educated middle class, which is the group that most contrib-
utes to voluntary community associations.122 
To foster the strong ties that a healthy polity requires, the state should 
seek to support the caretaking relationships associated with families at 
the same time that it also seeks to ensure strong bonds between citizens 
and communities. Some part of this goal could be accomplished through 
measures that are both family and community friendly, in the form of poli-
cies that support reducing workers’ long work hours and commuting time. 
These include regulations to shorten the workweek for all workers, meas-
ures to ensure that part-time workers receive wage and beneªt parity (in-
cluding health insurance) with full-time workers, minimum mandatory 
vacation time, more generous—and paid—family leave, and affordable 
high-quality childcare.123 It also includes public transportation and zoning 
policies that discourage urban sprawl and its attending long commute times. 
At the same time, the state should seek to foster at least some depri-
vatization of the nuclear family form, as it has taken shape in the United 
States. The pattern of childrearing in which parents have sole responsibil-
ity for childcare inside a private home isolates children and caretaking 
parents from the larger community. In privileging caretaking relationships, 
the state should seek to construct institutional arrangements that incorpo-
rate parents and dependents into the life of the community and share care-
taking responsibilities within the community. Tax subsidies for co-housing 
developments, in which some cooking and childcare are performed coop-
eratively, and supports for childcare cooperatives, are two measures by 
which the state can pursue this end. 
III. Difªcult Issues in Regulating Intimate Adult Relationships 
I have argued that the state should both recognize and encourage in-
timate relationships among adults that foster caretaking. In this last sec-
tion, I consider two difªcult issues that the state must confront with re-
spect to regulating intimate relationships. The ªrst concerns the form or 
forms that the state makes available to formalize intimate relationships. 
Speciªcally, should the state make available a single status such as “do-
mestic partnership” for all formalized adult intimate relationships? Or 
should the state make available a number of different formalized statuses 
for different types of relationships? In the latter case, the state would pre-
sumably continue to formalize some relationships as “marriages,” while 
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also formalizing other types of relationships. I then turn to the second issue, 
the measures that the state may legitimately use to encourage two (or 
more) parent families over single-parent families and formalized relation-
ships over de facto relationships between adults. 
A. Domestic Partnership or Marriage? 
The most difªcult issue with respect to how the state should treat 
adult’s long-term caretaking relationships is not, in my view, whether or 
not the state should accord some civil status to these relationships, or 
even the issue of whether the state should provide subsidies to caretaking 
relationships. As I have said, in my view the answer to each of these ques-
tions is “yes,” in large part because of the importance of caretaking to soci-
ety. The most difªcult issue is whether all such horizontal relationships 
should be formalized within a single category, such as “domestic partner-
ship,” or whether relationships should be categorized separately according to 
the general type of relationship at issue. In the latter case, the state would 
presumably retain a civil status for conjugal relationships such as marriage 
(which, out of justice and fairness, as well as for the goods associated with 
them, would need to be expanded to same-sex couples), but also recog-
nize other forms of adult-adult relationships, such as domestic partnerships 
between friends who cohabitate. 
Each of these two courses has signiªcant beneªts and costs. Grouping 
all adult-adult relationships into a single legal status has the advantage of 
guarding against the possibility that any particular subcategory of rela-
tionship, particularly marriage, would be unfairly privileged in the politi-
cal process as against other horizontal relationships. By the same token, 
clustering different types of horizontal relationships together into the same 
legal category would send a strong message that marriage occupies no 
paramount place in the legal hierarchy, announcing clearly that there are 
a number of ways that caretaking relationships can be forged and maintained 
in society, all of which should be equally respected. 
Yet this approach comes with two signiªcant downsides. First, it would 
keep the state from tailoring the particular obligations and beneªts assigned 
to that status to the type of caretaking relationship at issue. For example, 
when a child is born to or adopted by one of the parties within a conjugal 
relationship, it makes sense to accord a presumption of parenthood and 
right to adopt to the other partner. There is less reason to accord such a pre-
sumption in a non-conjugal caretaking relationship, however. The same is 
true for inheritance rights: as a default matter, it makes sense to assign a 
presumption that conjugal partners intend their partner to inherit (in the 
absence of agreements to the contrary), since most individuals in such rela-
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tionships leave their estates to their partners.124 It may make less sense to 
apply this presumption to other types of long-term caretaking relationships. 
Second, although moving away from the category of marriage has the 
beneªt of eliminating marriage as the privileged category, it has the related 
disadvantage that much of the positive cultural resonance associated with 
marriage—the notion that the institution is a serious, long-term bond of 
commitment based on love between two people who come together and take 
one another permanently as family—will also be lost.125 Eliminating mar-
riage may therefore weaken the resolve of those in relationships to work 
through rough periods. It could also dissuade those who would otherwise 
have married from formalizing their relationships, since the new form of 
formalization the state adopts will not have the same cultural resonance that 
swearing one’s love through marriage does.126 This could leave many of 
those made vulnerable by intimate relationships without legal protection. 
The alternative of retaining a conjugal status such as marriage, but 
developing other formalized categories of relationships that adults could 
choose to enter, has the beneªt of retaining the cultural and legal force 
associated with marriage and the accompanying beneªts of stabilizing this 
category of relationships through the relevant social and legal norms. This 
alternative would also allow the state to tailor a speciªc bundle of rights 
to the particular types of relationships at issue. For example, the state could 
adopt a formalized legal status for partners (not necessarily limited to 
two) who live together but are not involved in a sexual relationship, in-
cluding adult siblings, for couples who do not live together but are in a 
long-term, committed caretaking relationship,127 and more. The downside 
of this approach, however, is that it runs the risk that marital relationships 
will continue to be perceived as superior to other relationships and dispro-
portionately assigned privileges. 
At the level of theory, in my view, there is no clear winner between 
these two alternatives—each has its own set of beneªts and costs.128 At the 
level of political reality, though, the popular ideology (not to mention the 
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$50 billion a year wedding industry)129 is so invested in the value of mar-
riage that eliminating civil marriage is well nigh impossible. As a result, 
those (including myself) who seek to topple marriage from its pedestal as 
the preferred family form and to increase the equal regard for a broader 
category of relationships would likely do better to focus their attention on 
decentering marriage by proliferating other categories of status relation-
ships among adults, rather than seeking to eliminate marriage as a civil 
status and replacing it with a civil partnership category.130 This strategy of 
broadening the categories of relationships that receive legal protections and 
support and distributing a subset of the bundle of rights now received by 
marriage among these different relationships131 is not only the most prag-
matic course to take given existing political realities, but a course that 
offers signiªcant promise in furthering the goods that a liberal democracy 
needs to ºourish. Disaggregating the privileges awarded based on the ranges 
of goods at issue also helps deconstruct the monolithic notion of “The 
Family” and the orthodoxy surrounding it. This approach makes clear that 
there are many kinds of relationships that contribute many different pub-
lic goods, and that no one-size-ªts-all family is the ideal. 
B. Encouraging Marriage and Two (or More)-Parent Families 
I have argued that the state has a legitimate interest in preferring two 
(or more)-parent families over single-parent families where children are 
involved.132 However, the thorny issue of how the state should seek to en-
courage multi-parent families merits additional discussion. As I have argued 
elsewhere,133 the state has a duty to ensure that children have the caretak-
ing and other resources necessary to support their well-being and develop 
their capabilities. This duty exists whether or not the state believes that 
parents have made a wise choice about their family form and even if the 
state fears that ensuring that today’s children have necessary resources will 
send the wrong signals about better and worse family forms and therefore 
hurt future children: the duty to support the existing children is paramount. 
Based on this rationale, for example, it is illegitimate for the state to with-
hold welfare beneªts to low-income families based on mothers having 
additional children out of wedlock, if doing so would deprive the children in 
these families of necessary resources. 
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Above this required threshold of support, however, the state does have 
legitimate reasons to adopt measures that encourage multi-parent fami-
lies. In doing so, however, the state should still seek to harmonize the impor-
tant liberal goods at stake. In other words, the state’s goal should be to 
construct policies that avoid zero-sum situations in which furthering some 
goods operates to the detriment of others. Developing such policies will, 
however, require careful attention to the ways in which relevant goods may 
conºict. By this criterion, the state’s seeking to further two-parent fami-
lies by awarding them economic resources not awarded to single-parent 
families is a peculiarly bad tool to harmonize these goods. Not only would 
doing so keep resources from the very families who need them most, it 
also risks stigmatizing the very children who are most vulnerable. The 
state would do better to seek measures that do not pose such a stark tradeoff 
among goods. For example, the state could encourage multi-parent fami-
lies through job training programs and educational subsidies for youths 
who are at risk of becoming parents, since studies show that increasing the 
prospects for young adults’ futures makes it signiªcantly less likely that 
they will bear children while they are young and single.134 Such programs 
do not pit the important interests of current children against the important 
interests of future children, and they also have the virtue of increasing 
equal opportunity. 
The state should deal in a similar manner with proposals to shore up 
the institution of marriage (or whatever categories of adult-adult relation-
ships that the state retains). Proponents of marriage have proposed a number 
of policies recently to strengthen marriage, including making divorce more 
difªcult through returning to fault divorce laws,135 adopting covenant mar-
riage provisions,136 encouraging premarital counseling,137 and even award-
ing bonuses for marriages where no premarital abortions occurred.138 In 
choosing policies to strengthen the health and permanency of horizontal 
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relationships, the state should here, too, seek to avoid policies that require 
large tradeoffs among important goods. In this light, tightening up di-
vorce laws through a return to fault divorce, despite furthering the state’s 
interest in promoting marriage, severely infringes on citizens’ autonomy 
interests.139 The state would therefore do better to adopt proposals such as 
pre-marital counseling requirements that would avoid this stark tradeoff 
of goods. By the same token, as Linda McClain argues, many marriage pro-
motion policies risk perpetuating sex inequality within marriage.140 Given 
that women more often seek divorces than men, as Katharine Bartlett points 
out,141 the state could usefully support such relationships by encouraging 
men to be better partners through assuming an equal share of housework 
and carework.142 Such measures would infringe less on individual’s auton-
omy than stricter divorce laws and, at the same time, increase sex equality. 
In determining the measures that the state should take to further such 
relationships, it is important to keep in mind the limits of the state’s insti-
tutional competence to deal with the complexities of these relationships. 
The state can make it more difªcult for individuals to get out of marriage. It 
cannot, however, keep affection and caretaking alive within such relation-
ships.143 As I argued before, recognition of the state’s lack of institutional 
capacity in this area, as well as of limits on citizens’ own capacities in 
this area, should cause the state to limit beneªts awarded to families out 
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of concern for individual fairness. It should also cause the state to inves-
tigate means to encourage alternative caretaking networks for those who 
are not, either through chance or choice, members of intimate relationships, 
such as “mothers houses,” where single parents can raise their children 
more communally, or the types of informal networks among friends that 
helped provide caretaking for men in the gay community stricken with AIDS 
in San Francisco at the height of the epidemic. 
Conclusion 
Determining the stance that the state should take with respect to adult 
intimate relationships is so difªcult because these relationships implicate 
a number of goods that are central to our liberal democratic ideals and, at 
best, jibe uneasily with one another. Each of these goods—liberty, equal 
regard for all persons, insuring the caretaking necessary for human dig-
nity and human development, sex and economic equality, civic fellowship—
is too important to the liberal democratic project to be sacriªced whole-
sale to any of the others. By the same token, none ranks so supreme that it 
should be deemed completely to trump the others. What is called for, then, 
rather than focusing on a single good or two and ignoring the others, is a 
family policy that stitches the relevant goods together into a more nuanced 
set of principles that allows each of these goods to be given its due. 
This does not mean, of course, that a set of principles can be arrived 
at that allows each of these goods unmitigated scope, uncompromised by 
the others. As Isaiah Berlin eloquently states, the world is full of situa-
tions “in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, 
and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevi-
tably involve the sacriªce of others.”144 It does mean, however, that there will 
be places in which this tension among goods can be ameliorated through 
thoughtful policies. It also means that, where these tensions cannot be miti-
gated, choices among these goods must be made carefully. To do so requires 
a clear recognition of the important goods at stake. An approach that fails 
to do so, as Indian folklore tells us, would take one part of the elephant for 
the whole. 
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